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ROBERT LAYTON 
220 Banks Court 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(801) 579-5104 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT LAYTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HELEN QUINN, 
Defendant and Appellee 
: PETITION FOR REHEARING 
• Case No. 930191-CH 
Memorandum decision filed 
November 10, 1993 
Comes now the appellant and hereby request this court to grant a rehearing in 
the above-titled case and presents the following argument in support of this request. 
It is hereby sworn, under penalty of perjury, that the following facts are true 
and that this petition is present in good faith and not for delay and is done to search 
for the truth which is the purpose of a courtroom. 
FACTS 
Helen Quinn resided with Don Layton a number of years without performing 
the legal requirements to legitimize this relationship as a marriage. Robert was one of 
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the children born of this cohabitation. During the minority of Robert, Don and Helen 
were engaged in a business involving all types of tree trimming and removal, salvage 
and demolition of structures, and various investments. At almost all times, save 
school hours, Robert was brought to the job site and soon became an integral part of 
these business activities, negating the need to hire additional laborers. Monies were 
exchanged for these services and were placed in bank accounts of which all living 
expenses for the family were drawn and various investments began to be purchased. 
At no time did any family member receive a separate salary distinct from the others 
for all income was co-mingled for the good of the family. 
With bank loans, involvement of third parties financial backing, the small 
amount of liquid assets available from the family accounts, and the money in the 
birthday presents accounts of Robert, real property was purchased which included 
dilapidated rental income property. These properties were renovated by Don, Helen 
and Robert and the family business began transferring its time and resources to real 
estate investing and managing, again co-mingling income to further the family unit, 
which prior to the late 1970's all resided together. 
Beginning with the birth of a handicapped child, about 1972, the family unit 
and the business began to break down, with Helen spending less and less time 
devoted to the needs of the disabled child and her obligations to the business, and 
more and more time in social activities. 
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More and more obligations arose in the business and Helen continued to 
alienate herself from these obligations and Don, Robert and Ida Layton, took on these 
burdens to protect the business from financial ruin. 
In November of 1973, Robert reached majority and at no time between 1952 
and 1983 did any adverse claim arise challenging Robert's continual presence in the 
family home, nor partaking of the income received by and through the business for 
his needs, nor was any attempt made to exclude Robert's presence from the 
management, renovation and buying and selling of the assets of the business which 
now included extensive real and personal property. 
Robert devoted all his time and effort to the further benefit of the business 
having chose to remain with the business rather than seek a higher education, having 
graduated from high school in 1971. 
After Robert's graduation from high school, Robert's grandmother was 
fortunate to sell a parcel of land, and gave a portion of those proceeds to her only 
child, Don, and his family, Robert receiving a larger portion than his parents and 
siblings in hopes of using this money for tuition. 
Robert applied to the University of Utah and was accepted but declined to 
attend the freshman class, choosing to remain with the business and used the 
monetary gift to purchase a 1959 Corvette, which has become an issue in this trial. 
At no time whatsoever did Helen have or gain any interest in the car, nor did Robert 
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express his desire to give Helen some interest. At no time did Helen demand rent for 
storage of this car at various business property locations, nor demand its removal and 
Robert retained sole possession and control of this car prior to 1987. 
In about 1975, strife had arisen between Helen, and Don and Robert, and it 
became imperative that Helen be excluded from the business as a non-contributor for 
she was enjoying the benefits of the business and yet not suffering the obligations 
and Robert was an adult and a proper agreement was necessary between the family 
members involved in the family business. 
An agreement was made whereby Helen would take sole possession of an 
asset of the business in exchange for relinquishing all claim to remaining assets. This 
fact was done and no amount of denial by Helen or the court can change this fact in 
disregarding this agreement, and lies have been told to cover up that this event did 
occur and consideration passed. 
Helen agreed and subsequently moved to California and married Mr. Quinn in 
1985. 
Helen returned to Utah, resided in various locations, and filed an action in 1983 
claiming a right to be classified as married to Don Layton and therefore entitled to a 
divorce. This case was assigned to Judge Billings prior to her appointment to the 
Court of Appeals. It was the intention, through pre-trial hearings, that Judge Billings 
would classify the relationship as a marriage although it was not, and in spite of the 
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insistence of Don that Robert and Ida were indispensable parties their appearance 
was denied and the matter proceeded as if there had been a marriage. When Judge 
Billings was transferred to the Court of Appeals, Judge Young was assigned the case. 
In 1987, Judge Young subsequently ruled the existence of a legal marriage and 
awarded assets to Helen void of documented evidence of purchase by Helen in spite 
of proof of ownership by others. 
In 1987, Robert filed an action demanding accountability of this award and his 
and Ida's rightful portion of the family business be awarded them before any attempt 
to appeal Helen's marriage claims was taken by Don. 
Don Layton filed an appeal challenging the courts ruling of his marriage to 
Helen. 
This very Court of Appeals reversed this marriage theory in 1988 and 
remanded Judge Young to find alternative remedies to the relationship of Don Layton 
and Helen Quinn. 
Judge Young crossed out divorce decree and substituted constructive trust in 
its place. Don Layton once again appealed all the way to the Supreme Court and a 
typographical error led litigants to believe Judge Young's ruling was not a final order. 
Is it? 
During the pendency of Don Layton's appeals, jurisdiction is retained by the 
courts concerning the facts and division of property. 
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Robert did not proceed with his case seeking to recover property awarded 
Helen until all appeals of Don Layton had been exhausted. 
A collateral attack on a defective judgment cannot commence until that 
judgment is final and jurisdiction can take effect on the controversy. 
Robert's case was originally assigned to Judge Rigtrup, who recused himself, 
then reassigned to Judge Hanson. 
Through various pre-trial hearings, Judge Hanson made no mention of his bias 
which would manifest itself during the trial, namely Robert was barred from suing his 
parent, an agreement between the family members concerning the assets of that 
business was irrelevant, and minors were barred by limitations of proving their 
contracts still valid years after their majority and the continuing prior agreement. 
Trial was scheduled and a jury called and trial commenced. 
During the trial, Judge Hanson's bias began to appear and through 
unsubstantiated conclusions of law began to bind and gag Robert, which prohibited 
him from presenting his case. 
When Judge Hanson prejudiced the jury by his blatant unlawful statement 
claiming Robert would not be allowed to sue his parent in his court, not only was 
Robert bound and gagged, but now he was locked in a closet but ordered to 
proceed. 
Robert's case was to sue his parent for an accounting of his participation in the 
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business during the past 30 years. 
Robert did not voluntarily refuse to continue his case, but could not present a 
winning case while being restricted to the boundaries and peremptory rules placed 
upon him by the trial court which were insurmountable and further procedure would 
waste the jury's time trying to decide a case without sufficient testimony to find in 
favor of Robert. 
Whether various interlocutory appeals should have been taken, that point is 
moot, for this appeal raises issues pertaining to all actions taken by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. JUDGE BILLINGS SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HERSELF 
This court has incorrectly given Helen Quinn the status of a divorced person by 
Judge Billings. When Judge Billings was assigned this appeal, since she was the 
instigator of a marriage theory which became invalid between Don Layton and Helen, 
her involvement in this appeal is inappropriate. 777 P.2d 505. 
If Judge Billings would have correctly denied Ms. Quinn the status of married, 
this present case and its appeals might not have been needed, for the rules of the 
divorce case would have changed and the true and necessary interests of this 
partnership would have been brought to light. 
Therefore, since a person shall not be a judge in their own behalf, Judge 
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Billings' assignment to this case is error. 
II. DUE PROCESS WAS DENIED ROBERT LAYTON 
It appears to be the opinion of this appellate court that Robert Layton, despite 
being bound, gagged, locked in a closet, and ordered to proceed, failed to prosecute 
his case after an untimely motion was filed. 
It was the belief (which can be true or false belief = Socrates) that the right of 
due process and a day in court, unencumbered by restrictions to hide the truth, was 
a constitutional right guaranteed every citizen of the United States. 
"Whoever knew the truth to be defeated in a free and open discussion." 
John Milton 
"You cannot suppress the truth in an attempt to find the truth." 
Supreme Court Justice Brennan 
Since these statements were written long ago, and these words of wisdom 
seem archaic, in conversing with the citizens of the United States who believe the 
integrity of the courts have been compromised, it is their opinion that the courts can 
justify, by virtue of the millions of cases recorded in the digests of this country, any 
action or procedure they choose to pursue regardless of the true nature of the case 
and the issues a litigant brings before the court seeking justice. 
Why then is an appellant required to file a brief when the appellate court 
disregards the issues and creates their own conclusions of law and findings of fact? 
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Is this process only to increase attorney's fees and create problems in storing briefs? 
When the integrity of the courts are jeopardized and the courts become a 
medium to shift obligations and responsibilities and condone lying, cheating, and 
stealing, its citizens begin to lock their doors, bar their windows and arm themselves. 
This event is upon us. 
You're either part of the problem or part of the solution. 
Is the next step in the breakdown of justice vigilante groups in white hoods 
meeting in Star Chambers to dispense justice when the courts refuse to act when a 
transgression appears before them? 
Rule 7(b) Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. permits a motion to be applied for even 
during trial, and it is the duty of the trial judge to address those motions on their 
merits and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the issues 
raised. 
This fact alone must be regarded as prejudicial error worthy of remand. 
If it is the procedure of the courts to disregard its own rules, 
"then let us tear those pages from the books." 
Abraham Lincoln 
Why is it that the words uttered by honored statesmen of this country's past 
have so little impact today? Have their lives become nothing more than a holiday to 
go shopping, rather than honored for the principles they stood for. 
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III. AN INJUSTICE HAS OCCURRED 
It seems to be the opinion of this court that the likelihood of an injustice was 
not present in this case. 
What can be a greater injustice than for Robert to devote 30 years of his life in 
undying loyalty to further advance the family business, only to reach age 40 with 
reported lifetime earnings of $18.41 and a financial state of impecuniosity, yet Helen 
become unjustly enriched and financially wealthy at the expense of the true party that 
helped create that wealth by working in filthy sewage systems, crawling amid cobweb 
encrusted basements and dusty attics, clinging to steep inclined roofs installing 
shingles, replacing hazardous electrical wiring, and updating kitchens and bathrooms 
to make houses into homes increasing the rental income potential and making these 
homes into such pleasant places to live that the homes were seldom vacant after they 
were remodeled. 
No other case could possibly exist as a stronger example of injustice and 
unjust enrichment than for this court to affirm Helen's claim that Robert was 
mysteriously paid by invisible checks, failing to file required Social Security payments 
(United States Attorney General candidates withdrew their nomination for simply 
failing to provide Social Security payments for their gardeners and babysitters), when 
in fact the earnings of Robert, being an integral part of the business during his 
younger years, were invested in property in a fiduciary capacity, by his parents, which 
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were commingled with their own and not separated until Helen's agreement to leave 
the business in May of 1975 (See Exhibit D-13 Case No. D83-3977) with Helen's 
denial that this separation occurred in 1983, confirmed in 1987, challenged by Robert 
in 1987, and denied his rights in 1993. 
By Helen's actions and the court sustaining these actions, not only has Helen 
stolen his one provable asset (the Corvette), but has enslaved her child into peonage 
(which the law forbids), reduced Robert to poverty eating from store dumpsters, 
wearing rags, and doing odd jobs for grateful friends to earn money to pay his utility 
bills. 
This action might be acceptable if Robert had consumed his assets through 
waste, gambling, or a devil may care attitude toward his future welfare, but Robert 
chose to forego a college education, and invest his time and effort into preserving 
assets acquired during his years of working that could bring forth income the 
remainder of his life on the implied agreement that a community of interests existed 
for everyone's benefit. 
At present, Robert's childhood memories consist of demands to forego friends 
and playing games, in exchange to enslave himself to the family business, maybe 
receiving just compensation when the parents die, rather than an accountability at 
present, so Robert can enjoy the fruits of his extensive labor the past 40 years. 
Why does child actor Gary Coleman bring an action against his parents for 
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misappropriating his earnings for their own devices, but Robert be denied his day in 
court? Does justice only serve the famous or the best lawyer, or punish the 
downtrodden and reward the liar? 
The rights of minors to contract and to ratify those contracts by actions taken 
after majority have their roots in common law dating back before the Magna Carta 
(another archaic document)? (See Exhibit D-13 Case No. D83-3977). 
The unjust enrichment of Helen cannot stand to the detriment of Robert, for if 
Helen can be granted, in a court of equity, the creation of a constructive trust on 
mere conjecture and disputed testimony, the same right must be granted Robert and 
Ida Layton's estate also!!! 
IV. ADDITIONAL PARTIES WERE INDISPENSABLE 
It has been ruled that additional parties, which would have settled the issues 
between all the parties once and for all, could not be entered, but was it error on 
Helen's part instead to not plead, as an affirmative defense, the need to join 
additional parties, rather than the court prohibiting Robert from discovering during the 
proceedings that additional parties were indispensable and must be joined. 
When it appears at any time that additional parties are required to be joined to 
reach a complete and final disposition of the case, they must be joined by motion of 
the court or other remedies. Rule 19 Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. 
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Now that Ida Layton is deceased, estate tax obligations have arisen. By the 
rulings made by the courts in regards to Don, Helen and Robert, Helen by mere 
conjecture, is now the legal owner of extensive property unjustly held by Helen. By 
the same reasonings, the estate of Ida Layton can be filled with the property residue 
left from property demanded to be transferred to Helen and an action be commenced 
on behalf of the estate to be the owner in fact to this residue thereby stepping up the 
value upon transfer to the heirs and have the heirs admit falsely to the claim of 
ownership, thereby evading capital gains taxes when the heirs sell the property in 
excess of the current value or purchase price carried on the books of the true 
purchaser. 
V. ROBERT LAYTON'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION WAS IMPROPERLY 
DISMISSED 
In pre-trial hearings Robert's cause of action concerning a Corvette automobile 
was dismissed together with his claim to own one-half interest in a duplex known as 
213-219 Banks Court deeded to him by Helen. 
Now, since documented evidence supports Robert's purchase of the Corvette, 
and, for tax purposes, was an asset of Robert's, and Robert, by court order, now is 
no longer the owner, this car is now stolen for all practical purposes and when a tax 
return is completed it seems only right that the court be required to sign the return, 
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for Robert, upon signing the return, would subject himself to the Federal False Claims 
Act knowing the court has conspired with Helen to steal Robert's Corvette. 
In the same vein, now that Don Layton, by court order is the new owner, but 
cannot prove he did in fact purchase the Corvette, has the Corvette stepped up its 
value to todays market value thereby evading the capital gain taxes on the difference 
between its purchase of several hundred dollars by Robert years ago to todays 
inflated value of many thousands of dollars now awarded to Don by Helen's claim of 
ownership together with Judge Young's order. 
Does this figuring by the court and the judges involved amount to fraudulently 
interfering with the federal government's collection of taxes? Which takes precedent, 
a signed receipt transferring ownership, or a court decree based on lies. 
Figures never lie, but liars sometimes figure. 
When the right under federal law (a quitam action), permits a taxpayer to bring 
an action on behalf of the government to collect unpaid taxes and neither Robert 
Layton or Don Layton agree to the fabrication of figures by the court, it would seem 
that the court is the one guilty of tax evasion. 
A crime can occur at any time, and anyone can be a criminal. 
The only crime Al Capone was convicted for was tax evasion. 
Now that this tax evasion scheme has been declared legal by the court, should 
Robert begin a seminar to track wealthy children to persuade their dying parent to 
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claim to own the children's property through a constructive trust by vague reasons, 
thereby passing the property to the children at the market value when the parent dies. 
Robert wonders how long the IRS would permit this practice to continue. 
Now that police officers can violate citizen's Civil Rights, can judges conspire 
to commit theft and tax evasion? 
How appropriate that Utah is one of the leaders in the nation guilty of white 
collar crime. 
More crime is committed by the stroke of a pen than has been committed by 
all the criminals now in jail. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments set forth above, the only possible solution to the 
unjust enrichment of Helen theory, the rights of parties not made a part of this action 
needed for a full and final determination of the true and correct interest each may be 
entitled to, the extensive tax liabilities that have occurred, and to protect the integrity 
of the courts to dispense "justice" is to grant this petition for review, remand this case 
to the lower court with instructions to reopen the case and permit the plaintiff to 
amend his complaint, join indispensable parties, and proceed on a theory of unjust 
enrichment and the need to create a constructive trust based on partnership. 
No amount of pleading or submitting of case law in Robert's favor can change 
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the conscience of the court if none exists, but one word, "injustice," can compel an 
honest man to act. See cases attached and accented, 687 SW2d 731. 
This petition is submitted for rehearing, with the request for an answer to this 
petition pursuant to Rule 35 Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. 
SUBMITTED this ^ 3 day of ^ O ^ ^ I M ^ , 1993. 
TiU ^ 
C • ^ • " T ^ " ^ CLC^Vv d v^s. 
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FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
IN THE UTAH COURT 
00O00-
Robert Layton, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
v. ) 
Helen Quinn, ) 
Defendant and Appellee. ) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Attorneys: Robert Layton, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se 
Jane Allen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Robert Layton appeals the trial court's dismissal of his 
complaint. We affirm. 
Layton, the son of defendant Helen Quinn, filed this action 
claiming a partnership interest in his mother's share of property 
divided after his parents were divorced. The action was 
commenced in 1987. In 1990, the court ordered Layton to show 
cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. Layton responded, seeking a motion to stay the 
proceedings. The court denied the motion. 
Ultimately, trial commenced on April 25, 1992. On April 26, 
1992, Layton filed a motion to determine the rights of minors and 
a motion for a ruling on the legal right of defendant to retain 
property awarded defendant. Layton demanded that the judge rule 
in his favor or he would not proceed with the trial. The judge 
declined to rule on the motions, and Layton refused to continue 
with the trial. The judge dismissed Layton's complaint with 
prejudice. Layton appealed. 
On appeal, Layton claims the trial court erred in dismissing 
his complaint with prejudice. A court may, on its own motion, 
dismiss an action for want of prosecution. Brasher Motor and 
NOV 1 0 1993 
OF APPEALS . , 
{ / . Mary T. Noonan 
f Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 930191-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 10, 1993) 
Finance Co. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464, 464-65 
(1965). "The burden is on the plaintiff to prosecute a case in 
due course without unusual or unreasonable delay." Charlie 3rown 
Constr. v. Leisure Sportsr 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1937). 
Plaintiffs must "prosecute their claims with due diligence or 
accept the penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 
1323, 1325 (Utah 1975). Because a dismissal for failure to 
prosecute is within the trial court's broad discretion, this 
court will not upset such a dismissal absent an abuse of 
discretion or a likelihood of an injustice. Department of Soc. 
Serv. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, Layton filed two motions after one-half day of 
trial and refused to prosecute the case if the court would not 
grant his motions. Based on these facts we find no abuse of 
discretion or likelihood of an injustice in the trial court's 
decision to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's order of dismissal. 
Quinn has requested an award of attorney fees incurred in 
defending this appeal. Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, provides that if the court determines that an appeal 
taken is frivolous it may award just damages, which may include 
single or double costs and/or reasonable attorney fees. A 
frivolous appeal is defined as "one that is not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. 
App. P. 33(b). 
Layton caused the court to dismiss the case by refusing to 
proceed with the trial. His appeal of the order of dismissal is 
not warranted under the existing law and is therefore frivolous. 
Therefore, we remand to the trial court for a determination and 
an award of reasonable attorney fees incurred by Quinn on appeal. 
^ 5 v r o / ^ l / ' $$pkim0m**tmX'^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Putin-
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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Jane Allen, Bar #45 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 S. Main, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 355-1300 
«1E00«T.« COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 2 6 1992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT LAYTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HELEN QUINN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 87090 6386 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
This matter came on for hearing the 25th and 26th day of 
August, 1992. The plaintiff was present ,0 representing himself. The 
defendant was present, represented by her attorney, Jane Allen. 
The plaintiff has filed two untimely motions, and the Court has 
refused to rule on those motions. The plaintiff then refused to 
proceed in this matter, and accordingly, and with good cause 
appearing therefore, the Court now makes the following: 
ORDER 
1. The plaintiff's complaint, and all claims contained 
therein, are dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The lis pendens filed by plaintiff, based upon said 
complaint, is_hereby stricken, and delcared to be null and void 
ib:::thit9^ day of /\r< 
I CERTIFY T w v r r . 
ORIGljNAL DCCbMt 
DISTRICT C " , f r > * » . 
UTAH. 
NELSON ?. STATI 
Cite as S 
p plaint had expired, she was informed that 
|* there could be no settlement because of her 
^ failure to file her complaint in time and 
*** that the claim was barred as a matter of 
.law. She then filed a complaint, and the 
) trial court dismissed the action, as was 
done in the instant case. The majority of 
this court reversed the dismissal order in 
the Rice case, saying: 
Where the delay in commencing an ac-
tion is induced by the conduct of the de-
fendant, or his privies, or an insurance 
adjuster acting in his behalf, it cannot be 
availed of by any of them as a defense. 
One cannot justly or equitably lull an 
adversary into a false sense of security 
thereby subjecting his claim to the bar 
of limitations, and then be heard to plead 
that very delay as a defense to the ac-
tion when brought. Acts or conduct 
which wrongfully induce a party to be-
lieve an amicable adjustment of his 
claim will be made may create an estop-
pel against pleading the Statute of Limi-
tations.
 s 
If a grown woman can assert estoppel 
against a school district, I am unable to see 
why this four-year-old plaintiff should not 
equally be entitled to show that his delay 
in filing a timely claim was due to a misrep-
resentation made by the employees of Salt 
Lake County. 
The statute says, "A claim against a po-
litical subdivision shall be forever barred 
unless notice thereof is filed within ninety 
days . . . " 3 Certainly sufficient no-
tice was timely given to Salt Lake County, 
and there is no reason why a written no-
tice would have been of any further use to 
the county. 
The purpose of requiring notice to be 
given was properly stated in the Gallegos 
case, supra, as follows: "This alerts the 
public authorities so that a proper and 
timely investigation of the claim can be 
made . . . " 
Salt Lake County claims that there can 
be no estoppel because the employee who 
TAX COMMISSION Utah 4 3 7 
6 P.2d 437 
gave the erroneous information about the 
maintenance of the highway was not iden-
tified. That is no reason to cause this case 
to be dismissed. The plaintiff was not re-
quested to name him, and by the ruling of 
the court was not permitted to call him as 
a witness. 
CALLISTER, C. J., concurs in the dis-
senting opinion of ELLETT, J. 
29 Utah 2d 102 
Mary Jean NELSON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION of Utah, 
Defendant. 
No. 12756. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 7, 1973. 
Proceeding for review of a decision of 
the State Tax Commission denying a re-
duction in valuation. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that taxpayer's appeal 
would not be dismissed and Commission's 
decision affirmed because of taxpayer's 
failure to apply for formal hearing, but 
held that inadequacy of record did make 
remand to Commission necessary. 
Order accordingly. 
Henriod, J., did not participate. 
I. Taxation <S=>493(4) 
Appeal lay to Supreme Court for re-
view of decision of the State Tax Commis-
sion denying a reduction in valuation for 
property tax purposes. U.C.A.1953, 59-5-
46(2, 3), 59-7-10; Rules of Evidence, rule 
9(2). 
3. Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953 (Replacement Volume 7A). 
4 3 8 Utah 506 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
2. Evidence <S=>47 
Supreme Court took judicial notice of 
Code of Administrative Procedure adopted 
and published by Tax Commission. U.C. 
A.1953, 59-5-46(2, 3), 59-7-10; Rules of 
Evidence, rule 9(2). 
3. Taxation <S=a486 
When there is appeal from county 
board of equalization, there should first be 
hearing of informal type before Tax Com-
mission, in which decision is not intended 
to be final and appealable, but if taxpayer 
so desires, he may petition for formal 
hearing, which will then involve plenary 
proceeding and inquiry, after which Com-
mission must make findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and render its decision. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-5-46(2, 3), 59-7-10; Rules 
of Evidence, rule 9(2). 
4. Taxation <8=>493(9) 
Taxpayer's appeal from decision of 
State Tax Commission denying reduction 
in valuation placed on property for tax 
purposes, would not be dismissed and deci-
sion affirmed because of taxpayer's failure 
to apply for formal hearing; but inadequa-
cy of record did make remand to Commis-
sion necessary. U.C.A.1953, 59-7-10. 
5> Evidence <S=>60I(4) 
Generally, market value is highest 
price that willing, prudent, and well-in-
formed buyer would be justified in paying, 
and that a similarly circumstanced seller 
would be justified in accepting, if property 
were placed in open market for reasonable 
period of time and there was no compul-
sion either as to time or circumstances of 
sale. 
6. Taxation <£=348 
Mere fact that property had been pur-
chased at figure much below appraised val-
ue did not necessarily show conclusively 
what its valuation should be, and under 
circumstances, including circumstance that 
property involved was a comparatively 
large business property for which there 
was in fact very limited market and cir-
cumstance that purchase was made from 
bankruptcy trustee, it would be fair, realis-
tic and proper to give consideration to oth-
er aspects of valuation. 
7. Taxation <§=>493(9) 
It was within power of Supreme Court 
to remand to Tax Commission where 
record was, due in part to fault on both 
sides of controversy, inadequate. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 76(a), 81(d). 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, 
Craig T. Vincent, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., G. 
Blaine Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for defendant. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Mary Jean Nelson seeks review of a de-
cision of the State Tax Commission deny-
ing a reduction in the valuation ($530,700) 
placed on five parcels of real property 
used as a business complex at 5100-5250 
South State Street in Murray, for the pur-
pose of the 1971 property tax. She paid 
the taxes of $10,313.75 under protest and 
seeks recovery. 
The plaintiff purchased the property in 
question in 1971 from a trustee in bank-
ruptcy for $275,000, subject to the 1971 
property taxes. It is shown that the trus-
tee had previous offers, one an option to 
purchase for $350,000, which was never 
exercised; and another offer for $280,000, 
which was later withdrawn. It is princi-
pally upon the basis of these facts that she 
insists that the valuation of $530,700 by the 
Salt Lake County Assessor is excessive. 
[1] The plaintiff followed appropriate 
procedure in appearing before the County 
Board of Equalization asking for a reduc-
tion in the valuation. Upon being denied 
there, she appealed to the State Tax Com-
mission in accordance with Sec. 59-7-10, 
U.C.A.1953. As a consequence thereof a 
hearing of an informal nature was con-
ducted by the Tax Commission. There 
was no record taken of the proceedings. 
Subsequent thereto the Commission entered 
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a "decision" denying her request. She 
filed a timely appeal to this court.1 
The Tax Commission urges that this ap-
peal should be dismissed because the plain-
tiff did not apply for a formal hearing in 
which a plenary proceeding would have 
been conducted and the Commission would 
have made a final and appealable order. 
The Commission invokes the rule that be-
fore one may seek review of the action of 
an administrative body, the party must ex-
haust the available administrative remedies.2 
[2,3] Pursuant to its rule-making pow-
er, granted in Sec. 59-5-46(2) and (3), U. 
C.A.1953, the Tax Commission has adopted 
and published a Code of Administrative 
Procedure, of which we take notice.3 The 
Commission relies on Section 5 thereof 
which provides for two types of hearings: 
informal and formal. That rule projects 
generally that when there is an appeal 
from the County Board of Equalization 
there shall first be a hearing of an infor-
mal type before the Tax Commission in 
which the decision is not intended to be fi-
nal and appealable, but if the taxpayer so 
desires he may petition for a formal hear-
ing, which will then involve a plenary pro-
ceeding and inquiry, after which the Com-
mission makes findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and renders its decision. 
[4] The difficulty with the position 
thus essayed by the Commission is that, al-
though its Rule 5 just referred to may 
work all right if followed in that manner, 
there is procedure authorized both by stat-
ute and in other rules of its own Code of 
Administrative Procedure which justify the 
procedure followed by the plaintiff. 
Section 59-7-10, U.C.A.1953, referred to 
above, which authorizes the appeal to the 
Tax Commission from the County Board 
of Equalization, provides: 
. Upon receipt of such notice 
of appeal and record, the state tax com-
mission shall set a date for the hearing 
of the same and shall notify the taxpay-
er . . . . At the hearing on said 
appeal the tax commission may admit ad-
ditional evidence and make such order as 
it deems just and proper 
Every decision, order and assessment 
made by the tax commission upon such 
appeal shall be final . 
In its own Code of Administrative Pro-
cedure, Rule 9-1 provides: 
The Tax Commission will sit as the 
State Board of Equalization in discharge 
of the equalization responsibilities given 
it by law . . . . 
This is supplemented by Rule 9-3 of the 
Code: 
Hearings of the [State] 
Board of Equalization will be formal 
hearings, and an appeal in the form of a 
petition for writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah may 
lie from any order entered after such 
hearings. (All emphasis added.) 
On the basis of what has been said 
above and consistent with the general poli-
cy of the law that a taxpayer is entitled to 
a favorable application of the statutes and 
rules, we are not persuaded that the plain-
tiff's appeal should be dismissed and the 
Tax Commission's decision ipso facto af-
firmed. However, because the record be-
fore us is entirely inadequate we do not 
believe it would be in the interest of jus-
tice for us to attempt to analyze and pass 
upon the merits of this controversy on the 
basis thereof. As indicated above, it seems 
1. That an appeal lies to this court see 
Board of Equalization of Kane County 
v. State Tax Commission, S,S Utah 210, 
50 P.2d 418. 
2. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 310 
P.2d 549; Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 300 P.2d 592. 
Rule 9(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, pro-
vides, "Judicial notice may be taken with-
out request by a party, of duly 
published orders, rules and regulations of 
the departments or agencies of this state 
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that the only proceeding had was of an in-
formal nature and without any record 
being made and there is no transcript as to 
what occurred at the hearing. The Com-
mission did not make any findings of fact. 
There is only a stereotyped form with the 
blanks filled in indicating that a hearing 
was had, evidence taken, and the decision 
made. 
[5,6] Plaintiff obtained a stipulation 
that certain documentary evidence, which 
indicates, inter alia, the price she paid for 
the property, and which she urges as sup-
portive of her position, could be included 
in the record. Although we do not reach 
the merits in this decision, we offer this 
comment: The mere fact that this particu-
lar property was purchased at a figure 
much below the appraised value does not 
necessarily show conclusively what its val-
uation should be. We appreciate the valid-
ity of the proposition generally that the 
market value is the highest price that a 
willing, prudent, and well-informed buyer 
would be justified in paying, and that a 
similarly circumstanced seller would be 
justified in accepting, if the property was 
placed in the open market for a reasonable 
period of time, and there was no compulsion 
either as to the time or circumstances of the 
sale. 
Nevertheless that test is subject to being 
applied in a cautious and realistic manner 
in the light of the total circumstances. 
This includes an awareness of the difficul-
ties which may exist in regard to such a 
comparatively large business property, for 
4. See Tucker Realty Ins. v. Nunley. 10 
Utah 2d 97, 390 P.2d 410, and authorities 
therein cited nt footnote 6 therein. 
5. See LeGrand Johnson Con>orntion v. 
Peterson, 18 T'tah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 015; 
Rule 76(a), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
6. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure arc 
applicable to the review of administrative 
proceedings. Rule 81 (d), U.R.C.P. Even 
which there is in fact a very limited marj 
ket because so few people deal in SUCH 
high finances; and also of the exigenciej! 
which may exist in a sale in bankruptcy] 
proceedings. In such circumstances we] 
have no doubt that it is fair, realistic and] 
proper to give consideration to other as-j 
pects of valuation. On the other hand* 
there is physically present with the file', 
documentary evidence which might be re-
garded as supportive of the Tax Commis-
sion's decision. But there is no indication 
whatsoever that it is or was part of the 
record. We therefore cannot properly so 
regard it any more than we could any oth-
er extraneous document which someone 
may bring in and lodge with this court.4 
[7] It is within the inhere, 
the proceourarTOie^oi jyy^co^Ltoorder 
er trial of material a new trial, or a furth  
issues; when theinterests oi uisfice 
ure^Mmatnis is equally true w i t n r ? 
to the review of proceedings of ad-
ministrative agencies.6 Undesirable as it is 
to extend legal proceedings, in view of the 
unsatisfactory and inadequate record, due 
in part to fault on both sides of the contro-
versy, it is deemed necessary to remand 
this matter to the Tax Commission for 
such further proceedings as may seem ad-
visable. No costs awarded. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and ELLETT and 
TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, J., does not participate 
herein. 
without express statutory authority, the 
court can so remand to an administrative 
agency. See Public Service Commission 
v. Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville 
Ry. Co., 235 Ind. 394, 132 N.E.2d 698, 
134 N.E.2d 53; 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adminis-
trative Law, Sees. 764-767. The court 
should remand where the record is in-
adequate or if the administrative proceed-
: ing was improper. See 2 Davis, Admin-
istrative TJIW Treatise, Sees. 16.01-16.14 
(195S). 
§ 963 APPEAL AND ERROR 5 Am Jur 2d 
* . 
the 
§ 963. Remand for new trial. 
On reversing, jhe_appellate court vyijl ordinarily direct a new trial if, under 
c c i rcurr i^Qg£^S^^^SS8c^Bin^requi recn 
aT^courtswiirnot^ma^ case where 
questions of fact are present, even though it may have the power to do so.17 
The necessity for a new trial is deemed to exist whenever a jury verdict might 
be different from what it was in a trial where errors were committed.18 
Accordingly, if the rights of the parties turn on issues of fact as to which 
the evidence is in conflict, the reviewing court, in reversing, will ordinarily not 
direct judgment to be entered for either of the parties, but will remand 
to permit the fact issues to be resolved by the proper factfinding agency.19 
15. Where a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, in an action wherein an attach-
ment has been granted, is reversed on appeal 
and the case is remanded for a new trial, the 
ancillary proceeding of the attachment must 
also be remanded with it, even though the 
appellate court is of the opinion that the 
evidence warranted the granting of the attach-
ment. In this event the court below will be 
instructed to sustain the attachment in case 
the plaintiff is successful on the new trial, 
and if otherwise to dissolve it. Hogg v Thur-
man, 90 Ark 93, 117 SW 1070. 
16. Bryan v United States, 338 US 552, 94 
L ed 335, 70 S Ct 317; Re Guardianship of 
Smith, 42 Cal 2d 91, 265 P2d 883, 37 ALR 
2d 867; Fleming v Greener, 173 Ind 260, 90 
NE 72, 73; Cassard v Tracy, 52 La Ann 835, 
27 So 368; Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v 
Scott, 108 Miss 871, 67 So 491; Crocker v 
Mann, 3 Mo 472; Payne v New York, 277 
NY 393, 14 NE2d 449, 115 ALR M95; 
McCarty v Kepreta, 24 ND 395, 139 NW 
992; Eberle v Drennan, 40 Okla 59, 136 P 
162; Hoover v King, 43 Or 201, 72 P 800; 
Joynes v Pennsylvania R. Co. 235 Pa 232, 
83 A 1016; Palmetto Lumber Co. v Gtbbs, 124 
Tex 615, 80 SW2d 742, 82 SW2d 376, 102 
ALR 474; Bristol v Brent, 36 Utah 108, 103 
P 1076, Posnett v Marble, 62 Vt 481, 20 
A 813; Lchner v Berlin Pub Co. 211 Wis 
119, 246 NW 579, 86 ALR 12C6. 
In many jurisdictions, the practice statutes 
expressly empower th<* reviewing courts to 
order a new trial whenever that course is 
deemed necessary to the accomplishment of 
justice. See, for example, Rule 505, Tex 
Rules of Civ Proc. 
A new trial will be ordered by an appel-
late court where the trial court, in violation 
of a rule of court, failed to state the facts 
found by it upon refusing certain requests 
for rulings, and where the record does not 
afford any basis for correcting this error. 
Barry v Sparks, 306 Mass 80, 27 NE2d 728, 
128 ALR 983. 
A new trial, rather than direction for entry 
of judgment for defendant, will be ordered 
by the appellate court where the testimony 
as transcribed is not clear and it appears 
that the appellate court's view, taken solely 
from the record, might not be based on the 
actual evidence as fully presented to the 
trial court. Round v Burns, 77 RI 135, 74 
A2d 861, 20 ALR2d 1048. 
In the absence of statutory restriction of 
the number of trials a party may have, the 
appellate court will reverse a judgment and 
remand the cause (or a new trial, although 
the appellant has already been granted two 
trials in the court below, whenever the 
verdict is contrary to the law. Luckett v 
Townsend, 3 Tex 119. 
For the power of an appellate court in 
respect of a new trial based on evidence dis-
covered after expiration of time for motion 
in the trial court for a new trial on that 
ground, see NEW TRIAL (1st ed §§4, 4.1). 
17. Security-First Nat. Bank v King, 46 
Wyo 59, 23 P2d 851, 90 ALR 125. 
The power to remand for a new trial be-
cause of errors on the first trial extends to 
criminal cases. Giles v Commonwealth, 339 
Mass 410, 159 NE2d 536, disapproving and 
distinguishing earlier cases insofar as they 
held to the contrary. 
18. Hay v Baraboo, 127 Wis 1, 105 NW 
654. 
If the pleadings are too defective to sus-
tain a judgment on a verdict in favor of 
the plaintifT, the verdict must be set aside 
and the cause remanded on reversal of a 
judgment for the defendant. Brent v Davis, 
10 Wheat (US) 395, 6 L ed 350. 
An appellate court which finds facts to 
be different from the finding of the trial 
court on evidence as to which reasonable 
minds might disagree as to whether parents 
consented to the illegal employment of their 
minor child, in an action to recover damages 
for his death in that employment, should 
remand the case for a new trial, and not 
enter judgment absolute. Newton v Illinois 
Oil Co. 316 111 416, 147 NE 465, 40 ALR 
1200. 
1*. Hall v Gage, 116 Ark 50, 172 SW 833; 
Newton v Illinois Oil Co. 316 111 416, 147 
NE 465, 40 ALR 1200; Gregonis v Phila-
delphia & R. Coal & I. Co. 235 NY 152, 
139 NE 223, 32 ALR 1; Schneider v Lips-
comb County Nat. Farm Loan Asso. 146 Tex 
66, 202 SW2d 832, 172 ALR 1; Malone v 
Dawson, 117 Tex 377, 5 SW2d 965, 60 ALR 
665; Thiry v Banner Window Glass Co. 81 
390 
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elusion of all the evidence, or in the alternative for a new trial. The motion 
was denied. Upon his appeal the judgment was reversed because the evi-
dence was held insufficient to sustain it, and the case remanded to the 
district court with directions to grant a new trial. 
As against the defendant's contention that he was entitled to a judgment 
of acquittal because the triaj court, or in any event the appellate court, was 
required by Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to enter 
such judgment on proper motion where it finds the evidence insufficient 
to sustain a verdict, a majority of the Supreme Court, composed of six of 
the Justices, in an opinion by MINTON, J., held that the power of a court of 
appeals to give directions upon remand was governed solely by § 2106 of 
the new Judicial Code, authorizing the appellate court to require such fur-
ther proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances, and 
was not governed by Rule 29, which refers solely to the conduct of trials 
in the district court. The direction for a new trial was held appropriate, 
since a majority of the court of appeals thought that the defect in the evi-
dence might be supplied on another trial, and one judge thought that the 
evidence amply supported the verdict. 
BLACK and REED, JJ., took the view that the case should be remanded to 
the district court to decide whether a judgment of acquittal should be 
entered or a new trial ordered. 
DOUGLAS, J., did not participate. 
SUBJECT OF ANNOTATION 
Beginning on page 342 
Power of Federal appellate court to grant new trial upon reversal 
of conviction. 
HEADNOTES 
Classified to U.S. Supreme Court Digest, Annotated 
Appeal, § 1688; Rules of Court, § 4 -
remand — scope of power of appellate 
court. 
1. The power of a court of appeals, when 
•tmanding a case to the district court 
after reversing a conviction in a criminal 
case, is determined by § 2106 of the Judi-
cial Code (28 USC § 2106), which pro-
vides that a court of appellate jurisdiction 
may "remand the cause and direct the 
entry of such appropriate judgment, de-
cree, or order, or require such further DTQ 
ceedir ..^..f.t«f^^^MH%'^Hl^iMtlktna»Mlt»li-» 
« * 
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Dis-
trict Courts of the United States, con-
cerning motions for acquittal, does not 
affect, either to add to or to detract from, 
such power of the court of appeals, since 
this rule refers solely to the conduct of 
trial in the district courts. 
Appeal, § 1689 — remand for new trial 
— where conviction is reversed be-
cause of insufficiency of evidence. 
2. Under § 2106 of the Judicial Code a 
court of appeals, when reversing a district 
court's judgment of conviction in a crim-
ANNOTATION 
1. As to power of appellate court in 
respect of new trial based upon evi-
dence discovered after expiration of 
time for motion in trial court for new 
trial on that ground, see annotation 
in 76 L ed 480. 
2. As to inability to perfect a record 
for appeal as ground for new trial, see 
94 L ed 336 
REFERENCES 
annotations in 13 ALR 102, 16 ALR 
1158, and 107 ALR 603. These anno-
tations deal in Part III with the power 
of an appellate court. 
3. As to right of trial court to grant 
new trial as affected by appellate pro-
ceedings, see annotation in 139 ALR 
340. 
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LeGRAND JOHNSON CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and LeGrand Johnson, 
personally, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
James C. PETERSON, Rainbow Natural 
Stone Distributors, Inc., a Utah corpora-
tion, and Rainbow Stone Company, a Utah 
corporation, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 10499. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 30, 19CG. 
Suit to enforce alleged agreement to 
convey interest in certain mining property 
and to recover money advanced to defend-
ants, and defendants counterclaimed. The 
First District Court, Box Elder County, 
Marcellus K. Snow, J., rendered judgment 
and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Crockett, J., held that where trial 
court failed to make findings of fact in de-
nying relief to plaintiff who sought to en-
force alleged agreement to convey interest 
in certain mining property and to recover 
money advanced to defendants, and trial 
court commented that he felt that plaintiff 
had moral entitlement to additional money, 
and case was in equity, case was remanded 
for determination of facts on material 
issues in dispute. 
Judgment vacated, and case remanded. 
Trial <S=395(5) 
Purpose of rule imposing 
2. Appeal and Error <S==I 177(8) 
Where trial court failed to make find-
ings of fact in denying relief to plaintiff 
who sought to enforce alleged agreement to 
convey interest in certain mining property 
and to recover money advanced to defend-
ants and trial court commented that he felt 
that plaintiff had moral entitlement to addi-
tional money, and case was in equity, case 
was remanded for determination of facts 
on material issues in dispute. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rule 52. 
3. Appeal and Error <§=»843(l) 
Where it is necessary to remand case 
for further proceedings, it is duty of re-
viewing court to pass on matters which 
might become material. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 76(a). 
4. Witnesses <3=>342 
Where there is conflict in testimony of 
opposing witnesses, their reputation for 
truth and veracity is relevant issue upon 
which evidence may be presented. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-24-1. 
George W. Preston, Logan, Allan E. 
Mecham, of Clyde, Mecham & Pratt, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
Senior & Senior, George E. Boss and 
Robert Hafey, Neslen & Mock, Robert G. 
Pruitt, Jr., Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
The plaintiffs sued to enforce a claimed 
agreement to convey an interest in a certain 
mining property near Park Valley in 
western Box Elder County; and to recover 
money advanced to the defendants. The 
latter answered and counterclaimed, assert-
ing that any agreement to convey was oral 
and therefore barred by the statute of 
frauds; and that any money advanced was 
but an investment in a joint venture. Upon 
a trial to the court, it refused relief to 
either side and entered a judgment of no 
cause of action against both. However, 
the court made no findings of fact; and 
in connection with his ruling made the 
following statement: 
The court on an informal basis feels 
that the plaintiffs have a moral entitle-
ment to recover the unrecovered portion 
of their moneys expended on this joint 
venture. 
The dealings between these parties com-
menced in June of 1962, when the de-
fendant, James C. Peterson, approached the 
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plaintiff, LeGrand Johnson, to obtain his 
help in developing a rock-quarrying opera-
tion on a mining claim in Box Elder County 
in which Peterson owned a % interest. 
He proposed that Johnson provide finances 
and become general manager. The latter 
indicated a willingness to give financial 
support but said he was too busy to be-
come involved in managing the enterprise. 
It is not disputed that Johnson's finan-
cial help was accepted, and that he eventu-
ally advanced about $44,000. The conflict 
is over the basis upon which it was accepted 
and what he was to receive for it. Johnson 
contends that it was a loan which was to be 
repaid; and that for financing the enter-
prise, he was also to receive one-half of 
Peterson's interest in the mining claim. He 
further argues that his advance of the 
money was performance on his part which 
obviates the statute of frauds. In this con-
nection it is noteworthy that on several 
occasions the board of directors of the cor-
poration discussed the subjects of money 
owing to the plaintiff, proposals to repay 
it, and the conveyance of part of Peterson's 
interest in the claim to Johnson, none of 
which were carried out. 
Peterson's position is that the plaintiff 
was to be repaid only out of profits of 
the joint venture; and that the $19,000 
which was repaid to him was almost the 
entire profits of the enterprise up to that 
time. He claims that Johnson was to re-
ceive one-half of Peterson's interest in the 
claim only if their rock-quarrying business 
became successful; and further, that in 
any event he was not to respond personally, 
but that the deal involved the other de-
fendants, Brigham M. Griffin, B. II. 
Harris, Wendell B. Andersen and M. C. 
Harris, organizers of Rainbow Natural 
Stone Distributors, Inc.; and that inasmuch 
as Johnson knew this, he can look only to 
the corporation for any further recompense. 
!. See Art I, Sec. 11, Utah Constitution; 
Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees In-
surance Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 
873 (1965). 
Another matter about which there is 
dispute is plaintiff's charge that two years 
later, in 1964, the disputed mining claim 
was used as an asset in creating a new cor-
poration of similar name, Rainbow Natural 
Stone. Plaintiff avers that this was fraud-
ulent as to himself as a creditor, citing 
Sees. 25-1-4, 25-1-5 and 25-1-7, U.C.A. 
1953. 
tioncd, it seems a Tutile suggestion in the 
2. 70 Utah 1, 9, 257 P. 673, G76; see also 
Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 
Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284, and cases 
therein cited. 
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face of difficulties which drove the par-
ties to a lawsuit involving in excess of 
$25,000. It appears not to have been help-
ful to the parties, nor to the court in deal-
ing with the already sufficient perplexities 
which this situation presents. 
an objection was sustained. The rule is 
recognized by both our statutory and de-
cisional law that where there is a conflict 
in the testimony of opposing witnesses, 
their reputation jor truth and veracity is a 
relevant 
m 
Jnafrove, % 
view of the circumstances h 
scussed the conclusion seems in-
m 
escapab le thaMhe^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J 
for a dctenmna.ti^XLj^i^i^mmi^cts_ 
material issues in disoutesojjjgjf, 
gj^the 
K 
apropei^oinTjJaj^Q^^ 
caletne r\$&s_j^ih£S£*J)aiiA£zAiL-2L£QijL 
ance with applicable rules of law andequity.. 
[3,4] Having concluded that it is neces-
sary to remand this case for further pro-
ceedings, it is our duty to pass on matters 
which may then become material.3 Plain-
tiff called Mr. Jess James as a witness and 
questioned him as to the reputation of Mr. 
Peterson for truth and veracity, to which 
wmmmmmmmm—m 
3. See Role 76(a), U.R.C.P., Joseph v. W. 
H. Groves L.D.S. Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 
318 P.2d 330. 
4. Sec. 78-24-1, U.C.A.1953, states
 :
 M
 • • • 
in every case the credibility of the wit-
420 P 2d— 39Vi 
The judgment is vacated and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion, including the taking 
of any additional evidence that may seem 
advisable in order that the court may fulfill 
its responsibility of making findings on alt 
material facts and then rendering such 
judgment as it deems appropriate thereon. 
Costs to plaintiff (appellant). 
HENRIOD, C. J., and CALLISTER, 
and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
McDONOUGH, J., heard the arguments, 
but died before the opinion was filed. 
ness may be drawn in question * • • 
by evidence affecting his character for 
truth, honesty or integrity * * *." See 
State v. Marks, 16 Utah 204, 51 P. 1089 
(1898); State v. Olson, 100 Utah 174, 
176, 111 P2d 548 (1941). 
I 
f V*\ (Vi xJ \r\ - c 
£ 
" ^ fr">^0«K*<l fr,S ^ q e ' k ? 
JACOBS v. 
ClUM687S.W.2d 
the falsity of the statement published. It 
must be supported by evidence in the 
record of subjective intent See Foster v. 
Upchurch 624 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.1981); 
El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler, 447 S.W.2d 
403, 406 (Tex. 1969). 
The record is replete with evidence that 
Gilchriest was thorough in her research: 
she talked to county employees about the 
prospective grand jurors; she met with the 
grand jury commissioners that Smith had 
appointed; she reviewed the statutes relat-
ing to grand jury selection; and she met 
with several attorneys with whom she dis-
cussed the selection process. There is no 
evidence of actual malice in this record. 
For these reasons I would reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and af-
firm the judgment of the trial court 
SPEARS, J., joins in this dissenting opin-
ion. 
f O f KEY NUHBtft SYSTEM> 
JACOBS Tex. 731 
731 (Tex. 1985) 
held that Court of Appeals should have 
remanded entire community estate for new 
division when it found reversible error 
which materially affected the division. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Divorce <3=>287 
Court of Appeals must remand entire 
community estate for new division when it 
finds reversible error which materially af-
fects trial court's "just and right" division 
of property. 
2. Divorce <&=>287 
Court of Appeals could not simply mo-
dify trial court's decree by rendering judg-
ment on reimbursement claims because to 
do so would make a new division of the 
estate a matter within the discretion of the 
trial court. 
3. Divorce <&=>252.1, 252.3(2) 
Trial court has wide discretion in divid-
ing estate of parties but must confine itself 
to community property. V.T.C.A., Family 
Code § 3.63. 
Roy Livingston JACOBS, Jr., Petitioner, 
v. 
Ellen English JACOBS, Respondent 
No. C-2977. 
Supreme Court of Texas. 
April 3, 1985. 
In marriage dissolution action, the Dis-
trict Court, No. 309, Harris County, Burg, 
J., divided property and husband appealed. 
The Court of Civil Appeals, Fourteenth Su-
preme Judicial District, Paul Pressler, J., 
669 S.W.2d 759, reversed and rendered 
judgment as to part of property division, 
reversed and remanded another part, and 
affirmed remainder of trial court's judg-
Crady & Peden, Douglas S. Johnston, 
Houston, for petitioner. 
Burta Rhoads Raborn and Martha 
Bourne, Houston, for respondent. 
RAY, Justice. 
[1] This is a divorce case in which only 
the property division is challenged on ap-
peal. The court of appeals, after finding 
that the trial court had erred in determin-
what was properly a pa 
_m„ 
^ H ^ » reversed and rendered judg 
^ e n W F r ^ ^ r t of the property division; 
reversed and remanded as to another part; 
and affirmed the trial court's judgment as 
to the remainder. 669 S.W.2d 759. We 
reverse that part of the court of appeals 
judgment which limits the remand to spe-
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the judgment We hold that a court of 
appeals must remand the entire community 
estate for a new division when it finds 
reversible error which materially affects 
the trial court's "just and right" division of 
the property. 
The trial court found the value of the 
community estate to be between $1,300,000 
and $1,500,000. About one-half of this val-
ue was attributable to reimbursement 
claims. The trial court found the communi-
ty estate entitled to reimbursement for the 
time, toil and effort expended by husband 
on behalf of his separate property corpora-
tion, for certain community expenditures 
which benefited husband's separate estate 
and for certain income earned by husband, 
but diverted from the community estate to 
third parties. 
Husband appealed the property division 
contending that the trial court had erred in 
awarding reimbursement to the community 
estate, had mischaracterized certain proper-
ty and had erred in awarding wife her 
attorney's fees upon appeal. The court of 
appeals held that the trial court had erred 
in the following respects: (1) by awarding 
reimbursement to the community estate for 
the time, toil and effort of husband on 
behalf of his separate property corporation, 
(2) by awarding reimbursement io the com-
munity estate for income allegedly due hus-
band, but diverted by him to third parties, 
(3) by characterizing as wholly community 
property certain properties in which hus-
band had a separate property interest, (4) 
by characterizing as wife's separate prop-
erty certain properties belonging to the 
community estate, and (5) by awarding 
wife her attorney's fees on appeal regard-
less of outcome. 
Regarding the two reimbursement claims 
enumerated above, the court of appeals 
rendered judgment holding there was no 
evidence to support the first claim and no 
pleadings to support the second. The court 
of appeals also rendered judgment vacating 
wife's claim for attorney's fees on appeal. 
Regarding the mischaracterized property, 
the court of appeals remanded that part of 
the cause that affected the properties for a 
new division. The remainder of the proper-
ty division was affirmed. 
Both parties have filed applications for 
writ of error alleging conflicts jurisdiction. 
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1728, subd. 2 
(Vernon Supp.1985). Only husband's alle-
gation of conflict with Faulkner v. Faulk-
ner, 582 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 
1979, no writ) is sufficient to invoke our 
jurisdiction over this case of divorce. We 
have dismissed wife's application for want 
of jurisdiction. See Oil Field Haulers 
Ass'n v. Railroad Comm'n, 381 S.W.2d 
183 (Tex. 1964). 
Under a single point of error, husband 
argues that the court of appeals has erred 
in failing to remand the entire property 
division to the trial court for a new divi-
sion. Husband contends that the court of 
appeals' piecemeal editing of the property 
division made by the trial court is contrary 
to McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863 
(Tex.1976). We agree. 
In McKnight, the appellate court found 
the trial court had abused its discretion in 
how it divided the community estate and 
rendered a new division of the property. 
In reversing this judgment and remanding 
to the trial court, we held that an appellate 
court could not substitute its discretion for 
that of the trial court because a "just and 
right" division of the community estate 
was a matter lying solely within the discre-
tion of the trial court. McKnight v. 
McKnight, 543 S.W.2d at 867. 
In the present case, the court of appeals 
modified the trial court's property division 
by rendering judgment on the two reim-
bursement claims while limiting its remand 
to specific properties found to have been 
mischaracterized. McKnight, however, dic-
tates a remand to the trial court of the 
entire community property division for a 
new division. Although the court of ap-
peals appears to recognize in its opinion 
that the reimbursement claims materially 
influenced the property division, the court 
simply attempts by some unarticulated 
method to expunge the value of such 
claims from the community property divi-
sion. The result, if it could be achieved, 
SHRINK PILOT SERVICE, INC v HAUCK 
(.'lieu 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) 
Tex. 733 
would be to alter the trial court's plan for a 
"just and right" division of the community 
[2] It is, however, probably impossible 
to excise the reimbursement claims from 
the community property division, absent a 
remand of the community property divi-
sion, because such claims are not repre-
sented in the divorce decree by any specif-
ic, identifiable award of money, nor are 
they traceable to any specific properties. 
Even if the reimbursement claims could be 
identified in the trial court's property divi-
sion, the court of appeals could not simply 
modify the decree by striking the reim-
bursement awards "because to do so would 
be to make a new division of the estate of 
the parties, a matter within the discretion 
of the trial court" Faulkner v. Faulkner, 
582 S.W.2d 639, 642 fTex.Civ.App.—Dallas 
1979, no writ). 
[31 _The Texas Family Code requires the 
trial cour^v^^urucr^n!iVi5iuff ______ __JHMiT5138H5V 
TlW!735TBf!T l e e m s _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
; (VernorTSupp.1985). The 
trial court has wide discretion in dividing 
the "estate of the parties," but must con-
fine itself to the community property; the 
only property subject to division under sec-
tion 3.63. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 
S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex.1977). Whether the 
trial court abuses its discretion in dividing 
the property, as in McKnigkt, or commits 
reversible error in defining what property 
is properly a part of the community estate 
and therefore subject to division, as in the 
present case, the principle to be applied is 
the same. Once reversible error affecting 
the "just and right" division of the commu-
nity estate is found, the court of appeals 
must remand the entire community estate 
for a new division, 
That part of the court of appeals judg-
ment limiting remand to specific properties 
is reversed and the cause is remanded to 
the trial court for a new division of the 
community estate. In all other respects, 
the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
687S.W.2CJ—17 
SABINE PILOT SERVICE, 
IN(\, Petitioner, 
Michael Andrew Hi' nt. 
' ii C - . m ! 
Supreme Co ml of Texas. 
April 3, 1iW5, 
Action was brought alleging wrongful 
termination of employment. The 58th Dis-
trict Court, Jefferson County, Ronald L. 
Walker, J., rendered summary judgment 
for former employer, and former employee 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 672 
S.W.2d 322, reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that former employee stated cause of 
action based on allegation he was dis-
charged for failing to heed employer's di-
rection to commit an illegal act. Employer 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Wallace, J., 
held that narrow exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine exists for employee 
who is discharged for sole reason that the 
employee refused to perform an illegal act. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals af-
firmed. 
Kilgarlin, J., 
in which Ray, J., 
1 
filed a concurring opinion 
joined. 
Appeal and Error e=»934(l) 
In reviewing grant of a summary judg-
ment the Supreme Court must accept as 
•-<;* '.movant's version of the evidence 
,?'., . . •> every reasonable inference in the 
nor^i--' HM'- f.i*'' r. 
2. Judgment <s=>185<6) 
To sustain summary judgment the 
movant must establish as a matter of law 
that no genuine issue of material fact ex-
ists. 
3. Courts «=>91(1) 
Supreme Court is free to judicially 
amend a judicially created doctrine. 
